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The number of people connecting to the Internet is growing at an astounding rate: 
estimates range from 100% to 400% annually over the next five years. This 
unprecedented level of interconnectedness has brought with it the specter of a new threat: 
cyberterrorism. This thesis examines the impact of this threat on the critical 
infrastructure of the United States, specifically focusing on Department of Defense issues 
and the National Information Infrastructure (NII). A working definition for 
cyberterrorism is derived, and a description of the Nation's critical infrastructure is 
provided. A number of possible measures for countering the threat of cyberterrorism are 
discussed, with particular attention given to the concept of information assurance. 
Information assurance demands that trustworthy systems be developed from 
untrustworthy components within power-generation systems, banking, transportation, 
emergency services, and telecommunications. The importance of vulnerability testing (or 
red-teaming) is emphasized as part of the concept of information assurance. To support 
this, a cyberterrorist "red team" was formed to participate in the Marine Corps' Urban 
Warrior Experiment. The objective of this thesis is to address the impact of these issues 
from a Systems Management perspective. This includes taking into account the changes 
that must occur in order to improve the U.S.' ability to detect, protect against, contain, 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1 
A. OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................... I 
B. OBJECTIVE ........................................................................................................... 2 
C. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................. 2 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION .................................................................................... 3 
II. DEFINING THE THREAT ........................................................................................ 5 
A. THE CONVERGENCE OF CYBERSPACE AND TERRORISM ....................... 5 
I. Cyberspace Defined ............................................................................................ 5 
2. Terrorism Defined ............................................................................................... 6 
a. Tucker ................................................................................................................. 6 
b. Denning ............................................................................................................... 6 
c. Webster's ............................................................................................................ 7 
3. Information Terrorism ........................................................................................ 7 
B. INFORMATION TERRORISM VERSUS INFORMATION WARFARE ........... 8 
1. Information Warfare Defined ............................................................................. 8 
2. Use of Information Warfare ................................................................................ 9 
3. Information Warfare and The Internet. ............................................................... 9 
4. Emerging Vulnerabilities .................................................................................. 10 
C. DEVELOPING A WORKING DEFINITION FOR CYBERTERRORISM ....... 11 
1. Tools and Targets ofCyberterrorism ................................................................ 11 
2. Conventional versus Information Terrorism ..................................................... 12 
3. Categories of Cyberterrorism ............................................................................ 12 
4. Impact of Cyberterrorism Attacks .................................................................... 14 
D. THE THREAT OF CYBERTERRORISM TO AMERICA ................................. 14 
III. PROTECTING THE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE ................................ 17 
A. DEFINING THE INFRASTRUCTURES ............................................................ 17 
1. The Critical Infrastructure ................................................................................. 17 
2. The Information Infrastructure ......................................................................... 18 
B. EFFECTS OF INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCE ............................ 18 
1. Cascading Failures ............................................................................................ 18 
2. Increased Reliance ............................................................................................ 19 
3. Department of Defense Issues .......................................................................... 19 
C. COUNTERING THE THREAT ........................................................................... 20 
1. Categories of Defensive Mechanisms ............................................................... 21 
2. Implementing Defensive Measures ................................................................... 21 
a. Prevention ......................................................................................................... 22 
b. Detection ........................................................................................................... 23 
c. Barrier Defense ................................................................................................. 23 
3. A New Approach .............................................................................................. 24 
a. Information Assurance Defined ........................................................................ 24 
b. Defense in Depth ............................................................................................... 25 
4. Initiatives to Counter Cyberterrorism ............................................................... 26 
a. CERT Coordination Center ............................................................................... 26 
b. National Infrastructure Protection Center ................................ _ ......................... 27 
Vll 
c. The Center for Intrusion Control ...................................................................... 27 
d. The SHADOW Project ..................................................................................... 28 
e. The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection .................. 28 
f. The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office .................................................... 28 
g. The Information Systems Security Organization .............................................. 28 
h. CSIS Task Force on Information Warfare and Security ................................... 29 
i. Department of Defense Initiatives .................................................................... 29 
IV. CYBERFI. ........ , ....................................................................................................... 31 
A. OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................... 31 
B. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................. 31 
C. THE GENESIS OF CYBER FI ............................................................................ 32 
1. Developing the concept. .................................................................................... 32 
2. Information Warfare Ghosting .......................................................................... 33 
a. Hypothesis ......................................................................................................... 34 
b. Informed Hypothesis ......................................................................................... 34 
c. Simulation ......................................................................................................... 34 
d. Passive Observation .......................................................................................... 34 
e. Active, Non-intrusive Attack ............................................................................ 35 
f. Active, Non-hostile Intrusion ............................................................................ 35 
g. Active Takedown .............................................................................................. 35 
3. The Cyber Fi Profile ......................................................................................... 35 
4. The Target ......................................................................................................... 36 
5. The Team .......................................................................................................... 37 
D. THE SCENARIO .................................................................................................. 38 
V. THE URBAN WARRIOR EXPERIMENT .............................................................. 41 
A. THE MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING LAB .................................................. 41 
1. Overview ........................................................................................................... 41 
2. Mission .............................................................................................................. 41 
3. Concept-Based Experimentation ...................................................................... 41 
4. The Advanced Warfighting Experiment ........................................................... 42 
B. THE URBAN WARRIOR A WE .......................................................................... 42 
1. Mission Drive .................................................................................................... 43 
2. Current Focus .................................................................................................... 43 
C. URBAN WARRIOR EXPERIMENT RESULTS ................................................ 44 
1. The Monterey Scenario ..................................................................................... 44 
2. Focusing on the Urban Environment ................................................................ 44 
3. Cyber Fi's Analysis ........................................................................................... 45 
a. Testing ............................................................................................................... 45 
b. Technology Integration ..................................................................................... 46 
c. Parallel Growth ................................................................................................. 4 7 
VI. SECURITY IS A JOURNEY, NOT A DESTINATION .......................................... 49 
A. OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................... 49 
B. FROM VISION TO REALITY ............................................................................ 50 
1. Barriers to Penetration ...................................................................................... 51 
2. Network Security .............................................................................................. 52 
3. Middleware ....................................................................................................... 52 
viii 
4. Operating Systems ............................................................................................ 52 
5. Coordination ..................................................................................................... 53 
6. Intrusion Tolerance ........................................................................................... 54 
a. Fault Tolerance ................................................................................................. 54 
b. Countering Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks .................................................... 54 
c. Exploiting Technology ...................................................................................... 54 
7. Attack Forensics ................................................................................................ 54 
C. BALANCING ACT .............................................................................................. 55 
1. Cost and Implementation .................................................................................. 55 
2. Performance ...................................................................................................... 56 
3. Personnel ........................................................................................................... 56 
D. DEVELOPMENT OF TRUSTWORTHY SYSTEMS ......................................... 57 
1. Red teaming ...................................................................................................... 58 
2. Diversity ............................................................................................................ 60 
E. INFORMATION SURVIVABILITY ................................................................... 61 
F. THE NEXT STEP ................................................................................................. 63 
VII. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................... 65 
A. THE SHIFT TOW ARDS INFORMATION ASSURANCE ................................ 66 
B. PERSONNEL ISSUES ......................................................................................... 67 
C. STRATEGIC POLICY ......................................................................................... 67 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH ......................................................................................... 68 
LIST OF REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 69 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ..................................................................................... 75 
ix 
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
1. Growth of Internet Users ............................................................................................. 10 
2. Information Assurance Model. .................................................................................... 60 
3. Organizational Behavior Loop .................................................................................... 63 
xi 
Xll 
LIST OF TABLES 
1. Categories of Terrorism .............................................................................................. 13 
2. Categories of Defense Mechanisms ............................................................................ 22 




The number of people connecting to the Internet is growing at an astounding rate: 
estimates range from 100% to 400% annually over the next five years [Ref. I]. When one 
considers that there are approximately 160 million users as of April 1999 [Ref. 2], these 
figures become truly staggering. Negroponte estimates that by the year 2005, there will 
be over 2 billion people connected through the Internet [Ref. 3]. This unprecedented 
level of interconnectedness, touching nearly every part of the globe, brings with it the 
specter of a new threat: cyberterrorism. This thesis examines the impact of this threat on 
the critical infrastructure of the United States, specifically focusing on Department of 
Defense (DoD) issues. 
As the world comes to rely more and more on its information infrastructure, new 
vulnerabilities begin to emerge. The United States, in particular, is becoming 
increasingly dependent on its National Information Infrastructure (NII). The matter has 
been deemed of enough concern that a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-63) was 
issued for the protection of the Nation's Critical Infrastructure by President William J. 
Clinton. The faces of our Nation's real and potential adversaries have changed 
significantly with the emergence of cyberterrorism. While the DoD has become a 
primary target in the information age, it is but one of many within the NII. This 
increasing threat to our critical infrastructure demands that security practices for the 21st 
century shift their focus. It is no longer sufficient to build defensive "walls" around our 
systems; our critical infrastructure must be provided with a quantifiable level of 
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"information assurance." The challenge is to continue to function while under attack, 
even when the attack is partially successful. 
Information assurance demands that we develop trustworthy systems from 
untrustworthy components within power-generation systems, banking, transportation, 
emergency services, and telecommunications. This thesis addresses the impact of these 
issues from a Systems Management perspective. This includes taking into account the 
changes that must occur in order to improve our ability to detect, protect against, contain, 
neutralize, mitigate the effects of, and recover from attacks on our Critical Infrastructure. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the impact of cyberterrorism on the United 
States' critical infrastructure, with specific emphasis on the National and Global 
Information Infrastructures. The approach taken was to identify the characteristics of 
cyberterrorism, create a definition for it, assess the current state of the practice for 
combating it, and determine a methodology for countering this threat that applies to the 
21st century. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
To assess the impact of cyberterrorism on the DoD, National, and Global 
Information Infrastructures, in depth literature reviews, Internet searches, and discussions 
with personnel from the National Assessment Group, National Security Agency, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Navy Fleet Information Warfare Center, Air Force Information 
Warfare Center, and National Computer Emergency Response Center were conducted. 
Among the topics covered were Information Warfare, Information Operations, 
Vulnerability Testing, Critical Infrastructure, Terrorism, Information Terrorism, and 
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Cyberterrorism. This research culminated in the formation of Cyber Fi, a scenario-based 
cyberterrorist organization used to simulate a "red teaming" capability for the Marine 
Corps Advanced Warfighting Experiment, Urban Warrior. The result was a requirement 
for the development of a truly strategic policy for combating this new face of terrorism. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter II provides an in depth discussion 
of the threat of cyberterrorism. A definition of cyberterrorism is derived based on the 
research conducted. Chapter III discusses the impact of cyberterrorism on the National 
and Global Critical Infrastructure and the mechanisms available to counter this threat. 
The effects of interdependence among infrastructures are addressed, and the concept of 
information assurance is introduced. Chapter IV describes the formation of Cyber Fi, a 
simulated cyberterrorist organization, along with its involvement in the Marine Corps 
Advanced Warfighting Experiment and a plausible scenario that drives our conclusions 
for this thesis. The technique of Information Warfare "ghosting" is also discussed in this 
chapter. A review of the results of the "red teaming" conducted during the Urban 
Warrior Advanced W arfighting Experiment is presented in Chapter V. Chapter VI 
follows with a discussion of a possible direction for decision-making based on the 
mitigation of the effects of cyberterrorism, and includes recommendations for the 
implementation of the concept of information assurance. Chapter VII provides 
conclusions and recommendations for future work. 
3 
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II. DEFINING THE THREAT 
A. THE CONVERGENCE OF CYBERSPACE AND TERRORISM 
What is cyberterrorism? Barry C. Collin, a senior research fellow at the Institute 
for Security and Intelligence in California, first used the term in the late 1980's. He 
describes it as "the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism." [Ref. 4] In a more recent 
treatise, Mr. Collin elaborates further on the concept, stating "it is the intersection of the 
physical and virtual worlds that forms the vehicle of cyberterrorism, the new weapon that 
we face." [Ref. 5] To gain a better understanding of this concept, however, its 
component terms must be clearly defined. 
1. Cyberspace Defined 
To begin with, we must define "cyberspace," a term which was first popularized 
in William Gibson's 1984 novel, Neuromancer [Ref. 6]. Winn Schwartau, author of 
Information Warfare, describes it as follows: 
Cyberspace is that intangible place between computers where information 
momentarily exists on its route from one end of the global network to the 
other. Cyberspace is the ethereal reality, an infinity of electrons speeding 
down copper or glass fibers at the speed of light from one point to another. 
Cyberspace includes the air waves vibrating with cellular, microwave, and 
satellite communications. [Ref. 7] 
Cyberspace has also been defined as the "total interconnectedness of human 
beings through computers and telecommunication without regard to physical geography." 
[Ref. 8] Finally, a much more concise, albeit too simplistic, definition is provided by 
Merriam-Webster's on-line dictionary as "the on-line world of computer networks." [Ref. 
9] 
As described above, cyberspace does not only relate to the world of computers, 
but to the entire interconnected world of networks and telecommunications. The medium 
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is irrelevant; satellite communication links, cellular telephones, undersea fiber-optic 
cables, wireless local-area networks, token-ring networks, etc. are all part of this mesh of 
information and communication networks. 
2. Terrorism Defined 
We must next develop a working definition for terrorism. This, in itself, can 
prove to be a daunting task, as Mitchell, et al point out in their cyberterrorism White 
Paper. They note that there is no universally accepted definition, and that "about the only 
constant is that people continue to disagree" on the subject. [Ref. 10] 
a. Tucker 
In an effort to establish some common ground, David Tucker, an 
Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in California, outlines the five most 
common elements to 140 different definitions of terrorism as "violence, political purpose, 
intention to influence an audience, an action that produces terror, and threat." [Ref. 11] 
Using these elements, Tucker provides the following definition for terrorism: 
It is more than crime and less than war ... it is violence against innocents 
or noncombatants intended to influence an audience for the sake of some 
political objective. [Ref. 12] 
b. Denning 
The issue of violence or the threat of violence is also highlighted in the 
following definition by author Dorothy Denning: 
Terrorism refers to the actual or threatened use of violence with the 
intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments. It can be 
conducted by individuals or groups and is often motivated by ideological 
or political objectives. [Ref. 13] 
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c. Webster's 
Lastly, Merriam-Webster's on-line dictionary defines terrorism as "the 
systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion," while providing the following 
definition for the terms "terror" and "terrorize" [Ref. 14]: 
ter·ror 
1 : a state of intense fear 
2 a : one that inspires fear : scourge b : a frightening aspect <the terrors of 
invasion> c : a cause of anxiety : worry d : an appalling person or thing; 
esp : brat 3 : reign of terror 
4: violence (as bombing) committed by groups in order to intimidate a 
population or government into granting their demands <insurrection and 
revolutionary terror> 
ter·ror·ize 
1 : to fill with terror or anxiety : scare 
2 : to coerce by threat or violence 
3. Information Terrorism 
Through our research, we found that "cyberterrorism" is generally considered to 
be interchangeable with "information terrorism." However, we feel that, in order to 
utilize these terms synonymously, it is important to understand that "information" is 
being used to denote content, as well as medium. "Information" must refer not only to 
data, facts, knowledge, etc., but also to the systems, technologies, and infrastructures 
used to transfer or store these. In this context, "information" is analogous to "information 
space" or, more appropriately, "cyberspace." Thus, "information" can be, at once, the 
battlefield, the weapon, and the target in cyberterrorism. 
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B. INFORMATION TERRORISM VERSUS INFORMATION WARFARE 
1. Information Warfare Defined 
How does one differentiate between information terrorism (IT) and information 
warfare (IW)? Winn Schwartau describes information warfare as an "electronic conflict 
in which information is a strategic asset worthy of conquest or destruction." He goes on 
to write that computers and other communications and information systems actually 
become "attractive targets" in the world of IW [Ref. 15]. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
provide a more formal definition of Information Warfare in JP 3-13: 
Information Operations (IO) conducted during time of crisis or conflict 
(including war) to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific 
adversary or adversaries. [These IO] activities may be offensive or 
defensive in nature. [Ref. 16] 
JP 3-13 further explains: 
Information Operations involve actions taken to affect adversary 
information and information systems, while defending one's own 
information and information systems. They apply across all phases of an 
operation, throughout the range of military operations, and at every level 
of war. [Ref. 17] 
Rod Stark summarizes these concepts by defining Information Warfare as "any 
action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary's information and its functions, 
while protecting military assets against those actions and exploiting its own military 
information operations." [Ref. 18] IT is considered an "important subset" of IW [Ref. 
19]; however, this relationship is not as clear-cut as many authors make it out to be. The 
lines defining IW and IT are very gray and, in many cases, indistinguishable from each 
other. The main distinction between information terrorism and information warfare lies 
in the perpetrator and the intent. If the perpetrator is state-sponsored or the terrorist 
actions are actually committed by a state, then the actions should be classified as 
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information warfare. If the perpetrator's intent is not politically, socially, or ideologically 
motivated, then act is probably criminal (e.g., for financial gain) or simply malicious in 
nature. 
2. Use of Information Warfare 
Information warfare is by no means a new phenomenon. Denning asserts that "it 
is not even unique to the human species." [Ref. 20] She gives several examples in which 
fauna and flora use deception techniques for their survival. By modifying their 
adversaries' perception of reality, these "information warriors" of nature are able to 
defend themselves or vanquish their prey. History is rife with examples of man's use of 
information warfare, as well. From the protection of confidential information, to the use 
of deception and espionage, information warfare has figured predominantly in almost 
every facet of human life. But the face of information warfare changed dramatically with 
the invention of the computer, and more importantly, the emergence and explosion of the 
Internet. 
3. Information Warfare and The Internet 
In a span of only ten years, the Internet has gone from a mere 300,000 users to an 
incredible 163 million estimated users, as shown in Figure 1 [Ref. 21]. And this is only 
the tip of the iceberg, according to many industry pundits. Nicholas Negroponte, the 
founder and director of Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Media Lab, predicts that 
there will be one billion users worldwide by the end of the year 2000, with the majority 
of this growth occurring in third world countries [Ref. 22]. He bases these numbers on 
the belief that many of the world's developing nations will be leapfrogging past the need 
for a conventional telecommunications infrastructure. Instead, these nations will make 
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use of current and emerging technologies - such as Iridium and T eledesic - that may be 
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Figure 1. Growth of Internet Users. 
4. Emerging Vulnerabilities 
This level of worldwide interconnectivity has not come without a price. As our 
Nation - and the world - continues to move its critical infrastructure into cyberspace, the 
potential for exploitation by those interested in furthering their own agendas increases 
dramatically. Communications, commerce, banking, finance, entertainment, education, 
health services, and nearly all other aspects of our daily lives are inextricably tied to the 
information network realm. Even our Nation's defense information infrastructure (DII) is 
not exempt, with over 95 percent of military communications being routed over civilian 
links [Ref. 23]. This reliance on information technology is precisely the vulnerability 
targeted by cyberterrorists. And it is also the main reason why cyberterrorists may be 
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capable of inciting a tremendous amount of fear and anxiety, without having to resort to 
physical violence. 
C. DEVELOPING A WORKING DEFINITION FOR CYBERTERRORISM 
In order to derive a working definition for cyberterrorism, all of the issues 
discussed above must be taken into account. This definition must address the act (or 
activity), the perpetrator, the target (or victim), the weapon (or medium), and the purpose 
(or intent). Several definitions have already been proposed for information terrorism and 
cyberterrorism, but we found most to be incomplete. However, the definitions proposed 
by Rod Stark [Ref. 24] and Mark Pollitt [Ref. 25] encompassed nearly all of these issues. 
The authors developed the following definitions, using their work as a foundation: 
Cyberterrorism is the purposeful attack or threat of attack by non-state 
individuals or groups against any portion of a nation's information 
infrastructure, accomplished by leveraging information technology, with 
the intention of influencing its society or government through fear and 
intimidation, for the sake of some political, social, or ideological 
objective. 
Information infrastructure refers to the underlying computer and 
telecommunications framework, including, but not limited to, information 
systems, computer systems, computer programs, and data. 
1. Tools and Targets of Cyberterrorism 
In order to leverage information technology, the cyberterrorist must use it as a 
tool or as a target. For example, if cyberterrorists blow up the computers used to control 
the flow of oil through a pipeline, with the intention of disrupting the supply of oil to a 
nation, they are using information technology as a target. If, on the other hand, they 
insert a computer virus into the same system, with the same intentions, then they are 
using it as a tool (as well as a target). While the direct target of a cyberterrorist attack can 
be digital or physical in nature, its ultimate goal is to influence or coerce through fear and 
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intimidation. This is accomplished by causing - or threatening to cause - loss of life, 
injury, or the destruction or disruption of a nation's critical infrastructure, consisting of 
telecommunications, banking and finance, electric power, transportation, gas and oil, 
emergency services, and government services. 
2. Conventional versus Information Terrorism 
The distinguishing factor between conventional terrorism and information 
terrorism lies in the means by which the intended coercion is or may be accomplished. 
Conventional terrorism requires the use of actual or threatened physical violence in the 
pursuit of a political objective, to create a general climate of public fear and destabilize 
society, and thus influence a population or government policy. However, while physical 
violence can be a factor in information terrorism, it also includes the intentional abuse of 
an information system, network, or component, toward an end that supports a terrorist 
campaign or action. These activities may not necessarily result in direct physical 
violence to any person, while still inciting fear among the intended victims [Ref. 26]. 
Thus, without having to commit acts of physical violence, an information terrorist may 
still be able to achieve the intended results of coercion and influence. 
3. Categories of Cyberterrorism 
Information terrorism appears to fall into three of four broad categories, as 
suggested by Devost [Ref. 27]. He classifies these categories in terms of the weapon 
used and the intended target. The weapon used can be physical (such as a bomb) or 
digital/information-based (such as a computer program). The target can also be physical 
(such as a radio transmission tower) or digital/information-based (such as a computer 
database). An example of each of these categories is provided in Table 1. The first 
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category (physical on physical) relates to "conventional" terrorism, while the remaining 
three categories can be considered information terrorism. [Ref. 28] 
TARGET 
Physical Digital 
Physical (a) Conventional Terrorism (b) IRA Attack on London 
TOOL (Oklahoma City bombing) Square Mile, 4 Oct 1992. 
Digital ( c) Hacker spoofing an air (d) Trojan horse in public 
traffic control system to bring switched network. 
down a plane. 
Table 1. Categories of Terrorism. 
The category most commonly associated by the popular media with 
cyberterrorism is digital on digital (category d). The impact of these types of attacks is 
not due to violence, or the threat of violence, but rather, it is due to the disruption and 
potential chaos that they produce. This disruption can - and frequently does - lead to the 
requisite "state of intense fear" or anxiety described in the above definitions. Because of 
this, cyberterrorists do not have to resort to the use of physical violence (e.g., blowing up 
buildings or killing people). Instead, they can threaten with the disruption or destruction 
of a country's critical infrastructure. 
While cyberterrorists have the capability to commit acts of violence through IW 
means (as suggested in category c), we found that the majority of the incidents to date 
have been of a disruptive nature. These disruptions were generally a result of the 
destruction or alteration of data, and merely served to antagonize or annoy the intended 
targets. Again, this is not to say that cyberterrorism can not encompass violent means, as 
well. There are numerous actual or potential scenarios in which a cyberterrorist act 
resulted or might have resulted in the serious injury or death of its victims. While 
specific details about actual incidents have been omitted due to their level of 
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classification, current popular fiction is rife with examples of the destructive potential of 
cyberterrorism. 
4. l~pact of Cyberterrorism Attacks 
The absence of violence in a cyberterrorist act does not make it any less 
dangerous. While the psychological and emotional impact resulting from this type of an 
attack may not be as significant to the victims as that resulting from a conventional 
terrorist act, the actual impact could be greater from a political, economic, or social 
perspective. This is due, in part, to the fact that a cyberterrorist act has the potential to 
reach (and, thus, affect) a much greater audience. An explosive device placed in a train 
station, for instance, can only directly affect those persons unfortunate enough to be 
caught in the blast (not accounting for the emotional toll on the population as a whole). 
However, a cyberterrorist attack has the potential to reach a much wider segment of the 
population in one single act. 
D. THE THREAT OF CYBERTERRORISM TO AMERICA 
The level of importance being given to countering this threat is evidenced by 
President William J. Clinton's address to the National Academy of Sciences on January 
22, 1999. In his speech, the President issued a call to arms in the battle to "keep America 
secure for the 21st century," and discussed emerging threats to America's security "as we 
reach a new century." [Ref. 29] President Clinton announced major new initiatives to 
strengthen America's defenses against the emerging threats posed by biological and 
chemical weapons, and attacks to our critical infrastructure, computer systems, and 
networks. The proposed program will cost a total of ten billion dollars for fiscal year 
2000. While the lion's share of this amount will be going towards "conventional" 
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counter-terrorism security programs, nearly fifteen percent is being earmarked for the 
defense of our critical infrastructure, including power-generation systems, banking, 
transportation and emergency services, and telecommunications. This $1.46 billion 
investment - a forty percent increase over the previous two fiscal years - will help secure 
computer systems and networks that are potentially vulnerable to computer attack. [Ref. 
30] 
How can these systems be secured? This is the crux of the problem we face, as a 
result of our increased reliance on the information network realm. In order to address this 
question, we must first identify the critical infrastructure we are hoping to secure. It is 
not just our National lnfqrmation Infrastructure that we are growing more dependent on. 
As more and more global telecommunications and information system consortiums are 
formed (such as Iridium, Teledesic, and INMARSAT), transnational boundaries begin to 
blur. Satellite communications, global positioning, and cellular communications are only 
a few of the areas that are being absorbed into this Global Information Infrastructure. As 
we continue to make use of (and rely on) the GII, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
provide an acceptable level of security for it. 
The protection of our critical infrastructure has taken on a new urgency as our 
dependence on it increases and technology continues to advance at a blistering pace. In 
the following chapter, we describe the composition of this critical infrastructure and 
discuss its vulnerabilities. We provide an overview of the current "state of the practice," 
in terms of infrastructure protection, and discuss how the development and 
implementation of new technologies affects these practices. 
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III. PROTECTING THE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. DEFINING THE INFRASTRUCTURES 
There is a growing concern within the U.S. Government that our Nation's 
infrastructures are becoming increasingly vulnerable to the threat of cyberterrorism. The 
primary reason for this increased vulnerability is the level of reliance and 
interconnectivity that has emerged between these infrastructures. While this 
interconnectedness has made it possible to provide more services to more people than 
ever, it h~ become nearly impossible to discern where one service ends and the other 
begins. But exactly what are these infrastructures and how are they interrelated? 
1. The Critical Infrastructure 
In their 1997 report, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (PCCIP) defined "infrastructure" as a "network of independent, mostly 
privately-owned, man-made systems and processes that function collaboratively and 
synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of essential goods and 
services ... They are the lifelines of the Nation." [Ref. 31] They listed the critical 
elements of this network - the Critical Infrastructure - as transportation, oil and gas 
production and storage, water supply, emergency services, government services, banking 
and finance, electrical power, and information and communications infrastructures. Of 
these, the information and communications infrastructure has emerged as the most 
essential and pervasive component. Every other critical infrastructure element relies on 
the information infrastructure to transfer data, provide access to services, etc. 
The importance of our critical infrastructure (and, in particular, our NII) is best 
illustrated by the following excerpt from the PCCIP report: 
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Reliable and secure infrastructures are ... the foundation for creating the 
wealth of our Nation and our quality of life as a people. They are 
fundamental to development and projection of the military power that 
enables our diplomacy to be effective. They make it possible for us to 
enjoy our inalienable rights and take advantage of the freedoms on which 
our Nation was founded. Certain of our infrastructures are so vital that 
their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on our 
defense and economic security. [Ref. 32] 
2. The Information Infrastructure 
The phrase "information infrastructure" has an expansive meaning. Information 
infrastructure generally refers to "the information resources, including communications 
systems, that support an industry, institution, or population. Examples are a corporate 
information infrastructure, the financial information infrastructure, the defense 
information infrastructure (DII), the national information infrastructure (NII), and the 
global information infrastructure (GU)." [Ref. 33] An information infrastructure includes 
more than just the physical facilities used to transmit, store, process, and display voice, 
data, and images. It encompasses a wide and ever-expanding range of equipment, 
including cameras, scanners, keyboards, telephones, fax machines, computers, switches, 
compact disks, video and audio tape, cable, wire, satellites, optical fiber transmission 
lines, microwave nets, switches, televisions, monitors, printers, and much more. There is 
practically no part of the critical infrastructure that does not make use of one or more of 
these systems. 
B. EFFECTS OF INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCE 
1. Cascading Failures 
How does the level of interconnectivity between these critical infrastructures get 
leveraged into increased vulnerabilities? The main reason for this lies in the nature of 
their reliance on each other. The PCCIP reported that these infrastructures "may be 
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vulnerable in ways they never have been before," primarily due to their mutual 
dependence and interconnectedness. This collective interdependence provides great 
opportunities, as well as dangerous vulnerabilities. There is a very real risk of "cascading 
technological failure," resulting in a "cascading disruption in the flow of essential goods 
and services." [Ref. 34] In other words, if one of these vital. infrastructures collapses, 
there is a strong possibility that others will follow. Computerized interactions within and 
among infrastructures have become so complex that it may be possible to do harm in 
ways we cannot yet conceive. 
2. Increased Reliance 
It is precisely because of these complex interactions that the NII has become the 
most crucial element of our critical infrastructure. As technology advances, the level of 
automation and connectivity continues to increase, as does the level of interdependence. 
This, in turn, creates a greater potential for disaster resulting from attacks on the 
information infrastructure. As Denning [Ref. 35] notes: 
Computers and telecommunications systems... support energy 
distribution, emergency services, transportation, and financial services. 
Could the entire public telecommunications network be shut down for 
weeks? If so, what would be the consequences? Over 95% of military 
communications are routed over civilian links, so an attack of this nature 
would affect military operations as well as civilian activity. 
Advancements in technology also provide new and more sophisticated tools for these 
attacks, further compounding the problem. 
3. Department of Defense Issues 
As the military becomes increasingly reliant on the civilian information 
infrastructure for communications, intelligence, and command and control, the issue of 
how to protect, defend, and, if necessary, restore these systems takes on a new urgency. 
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To further compound this problem, there is a significant trend towards globalization in 
the commercial sector. Due, in part, to the ubiquity of the Internet, increasing numbers of 
corporations particularly in the areas of information technology and 
telecommunications - are merging to form pan-national consortiums. This trend poses 
new problems for our National Defense. How can we develop an acceptable level of trust 
and reliance in a system that is essentially out of our control (e.g., a cellular 
communication service owned/operated by another country)? How can we conduct 
offensive information operations (IO) against the NII of another nation, when it may be 
directly tied to the GII on which we must rely? In this New World of the 21 5tcentury, we 
may find ourselves protecting portions of the GII, even as our adversaries are using it 
against us. 
The DoD's trend of increasing reliance on the commercial sector is not limited to 
the telecommunications arena, either. The DoD is investing a substantial amount of their 
research and development budget on the use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
software and hardware. For instance, through their recent IT-21 initiative, the U.S. Navy 
has implemented Microsoft Windows NT and Office 97 as their standard operating 
system and office productivity suite, respectively. The result of this approach is that the 
DoD must rely on the commercial sector to provide many of the security measures 
necessary for the protection of its information infrastructure. 
C. COUNTERING THE THREAT 
How can we protect our information infrastructures from this growing threat? Is 
it even feasible to attempt to safeguard and secure such a complex and interconnected 
"system of systems?" Indeed, it is not only possible, but also necessary. However, while 
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many information resources can be reasonably hardened against all but the most 
sophisticated attacks, I 00% security is generally considered neither possible nor worth 
the price. As Denning states, "The goal is risk management, not risk avoidance at all 
cost." [Ref. 36] The rate at which technology continues to advance makes it even more 
unlikely that any one solution will be adequate to provide all-around protection. 
1. Categories of Defensive Mechanisms 
There are numerous mechanisms and tools that can be employed to provide for 
the protection and defense of our information infrastructures. These mechanisms have 
been found to fall into one (or more, since they are not mutually exclusive) of the 
following six categories: prevention, deterrence, indications and warnings, detection, 
emergency preparedness, and response. Table 2 lists these categories and provides some 
examples of the classes of mechanisms associated with each. [Ref. 37] 
2. Implementing Defensive Measures 
Until fairly recently, the commercial sector had not truly focused its efforts on 
developing and implementing robust security capabilities within its products. The main 
reason for this is that, up until the late 1980' s, there was no real need for these features, 
since the level of interconnectivity was minimal. With the explosive growth of the 
Internet and the emergence of electronic commerce, the demand for strong security and 
system reliability has grown. The main impetus for this has been the evolution of 
business on the Internet. As more and more businesses and consumers tum to the 
Internet to engage in commerce, the issue of security has come to the forefront. 
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a. Prevention 
The first approach taken to implement security - and one that is still very 
popular today- relied almost exclusively on elements from the prevention category. This 
approach was based on building "virtual walls" around a system to protect it from 
external threats. In creating this virtual perimeter, the goal is to isolate unauthorized 
users from accessing a particular system. In order for this type of security to be effective, 
a delicate balance between usability and protection must be struck. If a system has too 
many barriers, it becomes impossible to use; if it does not have enough, it becomes too 
vulnerable. Thus, this approach is essentially a compromise between ease of use and 
security. 
CATEGORY PURPOSE CLASS OF MECHANISM 
Prevention Serves to keep an attack from Information hiding, 
occurring in the first place. authentication, access 
controls, and vulnerability 
assessment. 
Deterrence Seeks to make an attack unattractive, Laws and the threat of 
but not necessarily prevent it. criminal or civil penalties. 
Indications and Aims to recognize a potential attack Collection of historical 
Warnings before it occurs or during the early information about attacks and 
stages, so that other measures can be analysis of trends. 
taken to avert the attack or diminish its 
effect. 
Detection Has a similar objective to I&W, but Audit logs, system scans, and 
generally refers to the use of monitors other network monitoring 
to recognize an attack after it has tools. 
started. 
Emergency Refers to the capability to recover from Backups, site mirroring, 
Preparedness and respond to attacks after they occur. redundant systems, and 
implementation of an 
information dissemination 
capability. 
Response Refers to actions that are taken after an Containing and recovering 
attack occurs. from damages and hardening 
defenses. 
Table 2. Categories of Defense Mechanisms 
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Most prevention mechanisms are primarily geared towards developing a 
"fortress" model of security, building a virtual wall around the system. Tools such as 
firewalls, login programs, and gateways were developed for access control. Encryption, 
which continues to be the subject of controversy within the U.S. Goveniment, is used to 
hide information, as well as provide authentication (through digital signatures). Even 
many of the vulnerability assessment techniques focus only on the "outsider" threat. 
Unfortunately, this leaves the door wide open to insider attacks, which account for sixty 
to eighty percent of all attacks. [Ref. 3 8] 
b. Detection 
To complement these preventive tools, numerous detection mechanisms 
were utilized. These included logs, audit trails, and other record-keeping tools that 
provide a "post-attack" picture of a particular attack or intrusion event. As in a physical 
crime scene, these tools yield some insight as to the extent of the damage caused by an 
attack, the methods used to conduct the attack, etc. They can be used to monitor both 
insider and outsider activities, helping to close some of the gaps described above. 
However, the purpose of these detection mechanisms is not to stop an attack while it is 
underway, but instead to use the information gained to prevent similar attacks in the 
future. Unfortunately, not all attacks leave clear trails, and some may leave none at all. 
c. Barrier Defense 
These two concepts - prevention and detection - have been the focus of 
industry's and government's approach to providing security for our information 
infrastructures. The majority of the COTS security products currently on the market are 
designed to provide a barrier defense. Implemented as both software and hardware 
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solutions, these products have met with varying degrees of success. Unfortunately, no 
single solution has ever been sufficient (aside from unplugging the system), and any 
flaws and vulnerabilities are quickly discovered and exploited by attackers. The ability to 
counter these attacks or threats of attack will require a significant shift in how we 
currently do business. Fortunately, this change is already underway, both in government 
and industry. 
3. A New Approach 
The problem is now being approached from a different perspective than had been 
considered standard practice only a few years earlier. Before, the issue was whether the 
systems were sufficiently secure. The new approach deals with whether we have an 
acceptable level of "information assurance." The concept behind this approach is to 
attempt to address all areas of concern, in terms of protecting and defending an 
information infrastructure. Whereas security tends to deal only with the protection of a 
system, assurance relates to a much broader set of issues. 
a. Information Assurance Defined 
Information assurance - a term that has only recently come into use - is 
described in Joint Publication 3-13 as follows: 
Information assurance is defined as information operations that protect 
and defend information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes 
providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating 
protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. [Ref. 39] 
For there to be information assurance, a system must be able to operate in a "trustworthy" 
mode, even when it has been compromised'. Much like the premise behind the original 
Internet (DARPANET), the system must be able to "heal itself' (by restoring or re-
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routing), and continue to provide an acceptable level of security and reliability to the 
user. There must be a certain level of assurance associated with the information being 
used. But, how is this level of assurance obtained? 
b. Defense in Depth 
In order to provide information assurance, the concept of "defense in 
depth" must be implemented. Defense in depth relies on the layering of defensive 
mechanisms at all levels, from the individual user to the Gil. This approach is certainly 
not new; examples of its use abound in military history. The idea of setting up a layered 
defense was central to much of the warfare conducted during the middle ages. Clearings 
(kill zones), moats, drawbridges, keeps, crossbows, archers, swordsmen, and postern 
gates provided medieval castles with multiple redundant ways of countering attackers 
[Ref. 40]. The same concept is used in modem warfare, where sensors (e.g., satellite-
based cameras) and weapons (e.g., missiles, aircraft, etc.) can be configured to provide a 
layered defense. By applying defense in depth to information systems, we are able to 
better manage the risks to our critical infrastructures, creating trustworthy systems from 
untrustworthy components. 
Although newer and more powerful prevention mechanisms continue to be 
developed, the level of complexity resulting from the tremendous amount of 
interconnectivity that exists in today's Internet makes it impossible to identify and isolate 
all possible flaws and vulnerabilities. As the infrastructure grows, its interactions become 
more and more complex and difficult to analyze. Thus, it is impossible to set up a barrier 
against every possible attack. As noted earlier, doing so would render the system 
unusable. It is therefore necessary to implement defense in depth. 
25 
Countering the threat of cyberterrorism requires that information 
infrastructures - from the corporate level to the global level - operate with a minimum 
level of information assurance. For example, a cyberterrorist might plan an attack on 
New York's central power grid during the holiday season in an attempt to cause a major 
airline disaster during the busiest time of year. With an appropriate level of information 
assurance, cyberterrorists would have to first overcome several layers of preventive 
measures (i.e., firewalls, authentication programs, etc.). Then, if they were able to do so, 
their attack would simply result in one of several redundant or back-up systems coming 
on-line, with minimum impact on the critical infrastructure of the city. Also, the ability 
to continue to operate safely and with a minimum of disruption can not depend on the 
method of attack used. For information assurance to be effective, the impact must be the 
same whether the attack was physical (e.g., a bomb) or digital (e.g., a computer virus) in 
nature. 
4. Initiatives to Counter Cyberterrorism 
Without an acceptable level of information assurance, any cyberattack has the 
potential to not only harm military operations, but also disrupt banking and finance, 
create power shortages, interrupt transportation needs and crash entire communications 
networks. What is being done by the Federal Government and private sector in response 
to this threat? There are a number of public and private initiatives currently underway, 
designed to counter or mitigate the threat of information terrorism. [Ref. 41] 
a. CERT Coordination Center 
CERT/CC studies internet vulnerabilities, provides incident response 
services to sites that have been the victims of attack, publishes a variety of security alerts, 
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researches security and survivability in wide-area networked computing, and develops 
information to improve network security. CERT ICC is widely known as a vital and 
integral organization dealing with computer security. 
b. National Infrastructure Protection Center 
Attorney General Janet Reno announced the National Infrastructure 
Protection Center in February 1998. It replaced the Computer Investigations and 
Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center and involves the intelligence community and the 
military. It was formed in response to concerns about the safety of national computer 
systems and charged to detect, deter, warn, respond to, and investigate unlawful acts 
involving intrusions and other threats against vital infrastructures. The National 
Infrastructure Protection Center uses several intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
to conduct investigations into threats to the Nation's critical infrastructure. The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) itself is seeking increased funding for fiscal year 2000 to 
protect government infrastructure and to improve internal information technology 
operations. 
c. The Center for Intrusion Control 
The Center for Intrusion Control will be modeled on the Centers for 
Disease Control and will be able to swiftly mobilize resources and personnel to fend off 
an organized cyberattack. It will identify and respond to serious cyberwarfare threats 
such as infiltration of financial institutions or other critical industries. It is not yet known 
whether this center will interact with the National Infrastructure Protection Center. 
Additionally, the status of the funding for this center remains uncertain. 
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d. The SHADOW Project 
Directed by Steven Northcutt, the SHADOW Project is the U.S. Military's 
on-going effort in the development of automatic intrusion detection systems. 
e. The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 
The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) 
was formed to advise and assist the President of the United States by recommending a 
national strategy for protecting and assuring critical infrastructures from physical and 
cyber threats. 
f. The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 
Announced by President William J. Clinton in May 1998, the CIAO will 
facilitate the creation of a national plan to protect the services that we depend on daily: 
telecommunications, banking and finance, electric power, transportation, gas and oil, 
emergency services and government services. Critical infrastructure assurance is a new 
capability that resides right at the point where our national security and economic 
security merge. This initiative will require a new level of commitment to partnership 
between the public and private sectors, specifically in the areas of policy formation and 
information sharing. 
g. The Information Systems Security Organization 
The Information Systems Security Organization of the National Security 
Agency (INFOSEC) has historically protected information critical to National Security, 
and they help protect communications and information systems of the Department of 
Defense and other federal agencies. INFOSEC is primarily focused towards information 
assurance. 
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h. CSIS Task Force on Information Warfare and Security 
The Center for Strategic and International Security (CSIS) Task Force on 
Information Warfare Security is a government-industry partnership addressing the threats 
to, and interdependencies of, our most critical infrastructures. They address a range of 
legislative, technological, and organizational recommendations and processes to better 
protect our infrastructures. Task force findings can be found in the recent publication 
Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism, Cyberwarfare: Averting an Electronic Waterloo [Ref. 42]. 
i. Department of Defense Initiatives 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has not taken these threats hands 
down. For "Eligible Receiver," a DoD information warfare exercise conducted last year, 
a team of 30 to 35 hackers was hired to see how far they could penetrate government and 
critical infrastructure systems. Over a period of three months, these hackers used off-the-
shelf hardware, software, and hacker scripts downloaded from the Internet to attempt to 
hack these systems. The DoD was shocked to find its systems "surprisingly vulnerable" 
to attack, especially since most government communication is conducted over 
commercial channels [Ref. 43]. Michael Vatis, the chief of the National Infrastructure 
Protection Center, sees the DoD as the "big banana, the final exam" [Ref. 44] for hackers 





At the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California, a team of 
graduate students and faculty members assembled a working group to conduct research 
on the cyberterrorism threat and its impact on the National Information Infrastructure and 
the Department of Defense. This group, known as Cyber Fi1, is made up of graduate 
students with a common interest in computer security, cyberterrorism, and information 
warfare. Cyber Fi's objective is to identify areas of improvement in our ability to detect, 
protect against, contain, neutralize, mitigate the effects of, and recover from 
cyberterrorism attacks. Based on the information presented in lectures and classes at 
NPS, the group is convinced that cyberterrorism poses a very real and imminent threat to 
the security of the United States. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The United States possesses both the world's strongest military and its 
largest national economy. Those two aspects of our power are mutually 
reinforcing and dependent. They are also increasingly reliant upon certain 
critical infrastructures and upon cyber-based information systems. [Ref. 
45] 
Advances in information technology have provided critical infrastructures with 
improvements, allowing systems to become increasingly automated and interconnected. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, these advances have also brought about an 
increased reliance on our information infrastructure, leading to new and unforeseen 
vulnerabilities. Terrorists and transnational criminals are rapidly becoming aware of 
these vulnerabilities, and are exploiting them through the power of information warfare. 
1 Credit for this tenn goes to Professor John Arquilla. 
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The explosion of the Internet has provided a means by which a cyberterrorist can wreak 
havoc from anywhere in the world through the use of a simple home computer. 
In order to mitigate or eliminate the threat of cyberterrorism to our information 
infrastructure, it is imperative that the potential effects of such an attack be understood. 
Research in this area has been somewhat limited, particularly in terms of large-scale 
vulnerability testing. Although exercises such as Eligible Receiver are invaluable to this 
type of research, they are (unfortunately) few and far between. Such attacks would have 
severe consequences for the Department of Defense, which has become dependent on 
computers and communications infrastructure. 
C. THE GENESIS OF CYBER FI. 
1. Developing the concept 
The Cyber Fi working group was conceived as a result of thesis research 
conducted by Maj Fritz Doran, a graduate student in the Computer Science (CS) 
department at NPS. A quest for thesis sponsors led him to the desk of Capt Jim Powell, 
the military chair of the Information Warfare Department. After Maj Doran told him 
what he was interested in, Capt Powell suggested a co-advisor team of Timothy Shimeall 
and John Arquilla. 
Prof. Shimeall, an associate professor in the CS department at NPS, has focused 
much of his research on computer security issues. His recent sabbatical at the CERT 
Coordination Center (CERT/CC) at Carnegie-Mellon University had made him very 
familiar with not only the various methods of attack that hackers were currently using, 
but also with the potential for damage to the Nation's critical infrastructure inherent in 
such attacks. Prof. Arquilla, an associate professor in the National Security Affairs 
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(NSA) department at NPS, has conducted extensive research on the topic of terrorism in 
the information age. He has published numerous articles (beginning around 1993 with 
"Cyber War is Coming!") warning that this threat is indeed very real. 
The professors and Maj Doran agreed that nothing short of a serious incident 
(such as a major U.S. city's infrastructure being successfully attacked, or a military 
exercise or operation being affected by a cyberterrorist attack) would convince all 
doubters of the validity of this threat. They began exploring options on how to provide 
convincing evidence of this fact without hampering or destroying either civilian 
infrastructure or military capabilities. 
A follow-on discussion between Maj Doran and Prof. Shimeall solidified the idea 
that a common interest was cyberterrorism, and that there is a need to prove that 
cyberterrorism is a real threat in today's increasingly computerized world. 
2. Information Warfare Ghosting 
Through their discussions on information warfare attacks and simulations, and on 
Prof. Shimeall' s work at the CERT ICC, Maj Doran and Prof. Shimeall evolved the 
concept of "ghosting" an IW attack against either civilian or military targets. While the 
specifics of ghosting an IW attack are more fully addressed in Maj Doran's thesis [Ref. 
46], "ghosting" can be broadly defined as follows: 
Information Warfare Ghosting is a scaleable attack upon the computers 
and network infrastructure of either an operational or simulated network. 
[Ref. 47] 
IW Ghosting is scaleable in that the levels of attack range from completely 
passive to highly active. These levels fall into seven categories. 
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a. Hypothesis 
At the low end, a completely passive ghost attack would involve knowing 
about either an existing or planned infrastructure or military operation and hypothesizing 
about methods of cyberattack. Also, open source research on the potential for success of 
such attacks would be conducted. 
b. Informed Hypothesis 
At the next level, the attacker would have available to him or her some 
specifics about the target. However, actions would still be limited to hypothesizing about 
potentially successful attacks. The difference would be that the attack could now focus 
on specific aspects of the target infrastructure. 
c. Simulation 
The attacker not only knows specifics about the target, but also has the 
resources to set up a simulation of the target system. Then, using the results of (b.) 
above, the attacker can actually see what the potential results of attacks would be and 
perhaps focus on low-risk, high-payoff attacks. 
d. Passive Observation 
At this level of ghosting, the attacker observes the actual working 
infrastructure that is the target. This observation could take place surreptitiously (as in 
spying) or permissively (as a trusted or semi-trusted insider) to gain further knowledge of 
the target. As before, the attacker (or attackers) could then use (b.) and (c.) above to 
distill the number of potential attacks down to the ones most likely to succeed. 
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e. Active, Non-intrusive Attack 
At this level, an attacker (with or without the benefit of information or 
observation) attempts to attack the target with the goal of penetrating the network. If this 
attack is successful, the intruder only views available information and/or maps the 
network. 
f. Active, Non-hostile Intrusion 
The attacker at this level has the express intent of "leaving a placeholder" 
to demonstrate to the attacked party (perhaps in real-time) that their network has been 
penetrated. Nothing is intentionally deleted, and intrusion is limited to markers such as 
"you have been penetrated" warnings on web pages, or e-mail messages from key users 
to themselves (perhaps with a copy to the net administrator) stating that their e-mail has 
been penetrated. 
g. Active Takedown 
This is the most extreme and intrusive IW ghosting attack and involves the 
attacker actively trying to disable some or all of the network infrastructure. At this level, 
"the gloves are off' and the attacker is free to do whatever he or she can think of to bring 
down the network. 
3. The Cyber Fi Profile 
What if a group of disgruntled, technically-oriented current and/or former military 
officers were to get together, pool their knowledge and expertise, and conduct a 
cyberterrorist attack against a U.S. military operation? Their motivation could be: 
• 
• 
Profit - selling their services to the target of the U.S. attack; 
Ideology - opposing what they deem an unjust aggression by the U.S. 




Old-fashioned revenge for perceived mistreatment at the hands of the U.S. 
government; or 
A combination of the previous three. 
Whatever their motivation, such a group would be a formidable opponent for defensive 
IW personnel, and would be representative of groups probably in existence in the world 
today. 
Using this scenario as the profile for their Cyber Fi group, Maj Doran and 
Professors Shimeall and Arquilla began making plans to conduct a ghost attack against a 
yet-to-be-determined target. 
4. The Target 
As the discussions continued, the players identified possible opportunities for the 
Cyber Fi group to pursue. The local newspaper, The Monterey County Herald, had been 
running a series of articles about the upcoming Marine exercise that was to be conducted 
in Monterey in the March timeframe. Called Urban Warrior (or UW), this "experiment" 
(in reality, an advanced concepts demonstration) called for a scenario in which a terrorist 
organization had seized a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and had the potential to 
use it. A host country, friendly (or, at least, neutral) to the United States, had requested 
assistance from the U.S. military in getting rid of this unwanted group of terrorists on 
their soil. The planners of Urban Warrior intended to use this framework as the basis for 
their demonstration During the discussion of UW, the group realized that this was a 
golden opportunity to pursue the idea of ghosting an IW attack against a U.S. military 
exercise that was to occur literally on the doorsteps of the Naval Postgraduate School! 
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5. The Team 
Maj Doran and Professors Shimeall and Arquilla decided to take advantage of this 
opportunity. In discussions with other CS and Information Technology Management 
(ITM) students, Maj Doran found that many people were doing thesis work in closely 
related fields, such as signals intelligence, hacking toolkits, wireless LAN security, and 
satellite communications security. 
Maj Doran and the two professors formulated a plan for putting together a team of 
such students (already familiar to each other) to conduct an exploration into what such a 
team might be capable of performing. This was the origin of the Cyber Fi team concept. 
They identified a diverse group of students whom they felt might be interested in 
participating in Cyber Fi, based on their military specialties, thesis topics, or expressed 
areas of interest. The final composition of the Cyber Fi team, and each member's area of 
expertise, is listed in Table 3. 
For the most part, these team members were already well acquainted and were 
aware of many of each other's strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, most members 
were intimately familiar with military doctrine concerning amphibious landings, which 
was to be the main showpiece of Urban Warrior. Maj Ogren, Lt Langevin, and Maj 
Doran adopted aspects of Cyber Fi as a main thesis, while the other team members made 
a commitment to support the team's efforts as much as possible. With this team and this 
idea, Cyber Fi began their efforts to prove that the cyberterrorism threat was alive, well, 
and simply waiting for the right team to demonstrate it. 
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NAME SERVICE OCCUPATIONAL THESIS COMMENTS 
SPECIALTY TOPIC OR 
ROLE 
John Arquilla NPS Faculty Irregular Warfare Co-Advisor Choi/Doran 
for 
Tim Shimeall NPS Faculty Internet Security Co-Advisor Choi/ Langevin/ 
for Doran/Ogren 
John NPS Faculty Software Engineer Co-Advisor Ogren/ Langevin 
Osmundson for 
Fritz Doran USMC Data Comm Cyberterror Team Leader 
Joel Ogren USMC Data Comm Cyberterror Satellite expert 
James USCG Info Tech Cyberterror Security expert 
Langevin 
Rod Choi USMC Infantry Hacker Doctrine expert 
Toolkit 
George USN Cryptology SIGINT 
Greenway Collection 
Wayne USMC Data Comm Wireless 
Collins Networks 
Kay Holt USN Cryptology Info War Insider 
(Reservist) 
Kristen Civilian Management Social 
Tsolis (MUS) Engineer 
Marc Sanders USCG Info Tech WWW Design Associate of 
group 
Table 3. Composition of Cyber Fi. 
D. THE SCENARIO 
A middle-aged man in a nondescript trench coat, sipping coffee at a Belgrade 
cafe's outdoor table, fires up his cellular phone. While appearing to idly flip through the 
pages of a local newspaper, he enters the international access code and phone number for 
a phone in Monterey, California. Within milliseconds, his voice signal is converted from 
analog to digital format, compressed, encrypted and interleaved, then transmitted in 
rapid-fire data bursts using spread-spectrum techniques to protect the privacy of his call. 
The call is seamlessly handed off from cell to cell until reaching the cellular network's 
main base. There, it is decoded and delivered to a landline telephone network, then 
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uplinked to a low-earth-orbit (LEO) satellite communications network. Bounced from 
satellite to satellite, it zips across the Atlantic Ocean toward the East Coast of the U.S., 
where it is downlinked to another landline telephone service and connected to the called 
party. 
Only seconds after being sent, the clandestine message is heard: "Hello, the U.S. 
military is landing helicopters inside the grounds of the U.S. Embassy. I'm taking a taxi 
to the airport before the shelling begins again." 
Back in Monterey, a small group of cyberterrorists goes to work. A large amount 
of background work has already been done over the past 12 months. All the information 
that they've used has been collected from "surfing" a host of web sites on the Internet, 
conducting social engineering in and around military bases, and conducting a variety of 
hacker attacks on selected web sites. At this time, the group knows with high certainty 
what military units are involved in the ongoing operations in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. They 
also know their basic tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as the IP addresses for 
the servers that these units are using for their own Internet connection. 
The assault unit going into the Embassy has been equipped with the latest 
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technology, including small handheld radios, a 
Compaq™ Libretto palm top computer, and Wavelan™ wireless technology. The 
cyberterrorists in Monterey quickly hack into the bookmarked site over an IP address that 
was mapped months ago. They trigger the Trojan Horse that was inserted into the site 
earlier, which introduces a random error in computations of a popular software package 
used on the Libretto. 
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The U.S. Service members at the Embassy begin receiving a constant stream of 
small arms fire along with an occasional Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG). They call for 
a fire mission using the software on the Libretto. The fire mission is communicated 
through their network to a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier sitting off the coast, and 
immediately an officer on board assigns a pair of F-18s who are airborne waiting for 
tasking. Their job: taking out the enemy forces on the ground. The F-18s punch in the 
data to their smart weapons, using the geo-positioning data provided in the fire mission 
from the Embassy forces. The target is identified, locked, and fired upon. Minutes later, 
multiple explosions rock the downtown area, where the historic public library has been 
turned into a pile of rubble. Meanwhile, back at the Embassy, the U.S. forces continue to 
receive fire from an enemy that wasn't touched by the F-18s, who just destroyed a target 
5 miles away. 
Welcome to the world of cyberterrorism. 
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V. THE URBAN WARRIOR EXPERIMENT 
A. THE MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING LAB 
1. Overview 
General Charles C. Krolak, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, established the 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) in October 1995. It is located at · 
Quantico, Virginia, and is part of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
(MCCDC). 
2. Mission 
MCWL's mission is to serve as the focal point for refinement of future 
warfighting capabilities. To this end, the Lab develops tactics, techniques and 
procedures, and evaluates advanced technologies that create or enhance future 
warfighting capabilities. It also integrates tactics, techniques, procedures and advanced 
technologies into the Marine Corps Combat Development System. 
3. Concept-Based Experimentation 
New warfightiiig capabilities are developed through a process called concept-
based experimentation. A concept is developed by MCCDC that may improve future 
warfighting capabilities. Required warfighting capabilities to support those concepts are 
identified, analyzed and refined through wargaming, complemented by advanced 
technology if necessary, and then evaluated through experimentation to determine 
warfighting relevance. 
This experimentation usually yields three results. The capabilities either work, 
don't work, or need further refinement. If a capability works, it is integrated into the 
Combat Development Process at Quantico. If it fails - not every idea that looks good on 
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paper works in the real world - it is discarded. Failed experimentation is, in itself, a 
success. If a capability doesn't work but shows promise, it is refined for further 
experimentation. [Ref. 48] 
4. The Advanced Warfighting Experiment 
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory developed a five-year program called 
the Advanced Warfighting Experiment (A WE). A WE's mandate is to exploit 
information technology opportunities, and develop innovative solutions to address 
technology gaps in a layered defense. The A WE's seek to leverage critical warfighting 
concepts and general technological bases that show future potential. [Ref. 49] 
B. THEURBANWARRIORAWE 
The Urban Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment was developed as a subset 
experiment to examine new concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures, and technologies to 
meet the challenges of conflict in urban environments. 
An excellent overview of the framework for Urban Warrior is summarized by 
Wood [Ref. 50] in the following statements: 
Urban Warrior ... begins with an assessment of future context and what 
conditions may lie ahead. The Marine Corps W arfighting Lab translates 
that context into concepts for employing forces. In turn, the concepts are 
broken down into essential capabilities. These are the grist for the Urban 
Warrior series of experiments. Reflecting this logic, the Urban Warrior 
Conceptual Experimental Framework presents the urban warfare concepts 
and enabling capabilities that we believe should guide experiment-based 
development of naval expeditionary operations on the urban littoral. 
This framework also addresses technology, as follows: 
As we prepare to embark on joint experimentation, the premium on clear 
thinking and rigorous analysis grows. Choosing intelligently demands an 
understanding of future context and concepts. These give us logical 
backboards against which to bounce various technology alternatives and 
make operationally sound choices. 
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1. Mission Drive 
The Advanced W arfighting Experiment was created to test and evaluate potential 
system level solutions into a set of integrated comprehensive solutions to military issues. 
Once a solution is determined to be viable, the systems are engineered into the overall 
architecture. Upon incorporation into the overall architecture, the entire architecture 
must be reevaluated to determine the impact of the modifications prior to deployment. 
These newly integrated systems can't be deployed haphazardly. The architecture, 
system, and management levels must all be clearly understood in order to put these 
systems together, and there must be an understanding of what you have once you've done 
this. 
2. Current Focus 
There have been significant accomplishments in the research conducted in the 
information survivability area, including enhanced barrier protection in the prevention 
area and innovative methods in intrusion detection. 
The realm of information technology operations (ITO) is changing focus to the 
world of information assurance. This provides the ability to take technologies out of the 
information systems programs, and start integrating them into a comprehensive 
architecture. The next phase for the ITO would be a program based on inherent 
survivability. This research area has recently begun to focus on the global intrusion 
detection problem and intrusion tolerance. 
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C. URBAN WARRIOR EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
1. The Monterey Scenario 
The scenario for the Urban Warrior Experiment, which took place in Monterey, 
California, was developed to test the Marines' ability to deal with terrorist threats, 
provide disaster assistance, and simulate civil-military relations in an international 
setting. 
The scenario depicted Monterey as a city in a fictional, sovereign international 
country that had requested support from the United States. The Special Purpose Marine 
Air-Ground Task Force (Experimental) (SPMAGT-X), located aboard an off-shore 
amphibious ready group (ARG), landed Marines to help stabilize the situation and search 
for individuals who may be manufacturing a (simulated) biological weapon of mass 
destruction. The scenario called for the initial force to be reinforced by the Chemical-
Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), a Marine unit from Camp Lejeune, N.C., 
created specifically to respond to the threat of chemical and biological weapons. 
2. Focusing on the Urban Environment 
The Marine Corps' top minds foresee a majority of the conflicts and other military 
interventions in the future taking place in the canyons and peaks of urban terrain, perhaps 
the most difficult and chaotic region to overcome. As LtGen John Rhodes, commanding 
general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, has stated: 
It was much easier when we just had bad guys and good guys ... today 
there's far less certainty in regards to the where, when, how and why [of 
combat]. [Ref. 51] 
To better prepare the Corps for such challenges in the urban environment, the 
Marine Corps Warfighting Lab has dedicated a third of its five-year experimentation 
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process to testing new tactics, equipment, and philosophies in this unpredictable terrain. 
"Urban Warrior" is the second phase in the Lab's effort to ready Marines for combat in 
the next century. 
3. Cyber Fi's Analysis 
As described in the previous chapter, Cyber Fi's involvement was intended to 
include observation of the Red Cell efforts, passive signals collection (SIGINT); 
modeling and simulation of the UW network architecture (allowing active network 
intrusion efforts on the simulation LAN); and passive collection of wireless LAN signals 
during the experiment. The late entry of the research team into the experiment limited 
our participation to passive monitoring. Nevertheless, a number of salient points were 
discovered. 
a. Testing 
While Cyber Fi felt that the Urban Warrior Experiment did not provide a 
thorough test and evaluation of the many new technologies involved, the authors 
understand the purpose was more akin to a "proof of concept" for these technologies. It 
would have been impossible for the planners to incorporate full red-teaming activities, 
given the constraints they had to work with. If the Information Warfare red team had 
been given full latitude in their attacks, Urban Warrior would have ground to a complete 
halt, and none of the other new technologies being looked at could have been evaluated. 
However, it is of utmost importance that the results be considered in this light; that is, 
these technologies proved to be viable (or not) only in a benign, controlled environment. 
The only decision that should be made based on Urban Warrior is to 
discard those systems that did not prove to be effective. Those that seemed to have 
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operational value MUST be experimented with further before bringing them on-line. 
Although this may seem to lengthen the development and acquisition process somewhat 
(a concept DoD is trying to get away from), it is necessary to ensure that the systems 
being endorsed for battlefield use will indeed be of real value to the warfighter. These 
systems will have to be tested and evaluated in much more rigorous conditions, facing 
red teams that are being given sufficient leeway to pose a significant and realistic threat. 
b. Technology Integration 
The integration of emerging technology must be consistent with sound 
security testing used with current technology. How should this testing be accomplished? 
The effectiveness of "red teaming" or "scrimmaging" has long been known. From 
military units, to sports teams, to professionals, practicing for an event using a realistic 
opponent is invaluable in determining whether your strategy for success is valid. In 
terms of information technologies, the best way to find your system's vulnerabilities is to 
actively attack it, in a realistic operational environment. 
The Cyber Fi group· encountered this situation during Urban Warrior. One 
of the new technologies being tested was the End User Terminal (EUT), and their 
vulnerabilities in terms of sniffing, spoofing, and Denial of Service (DoS). The systems 
must be tested in much more rigorous manner, particularly in terms of its human-
interface interaction. 
If the system is rendered inoperative or compromised, how can the 
information be disseminated to the users? What measures can the users take to ensure the 
authenticity of the information they are receiving? To what degree can the users 
troubleshoot the equipment in the field? What are the users doing to ensure a certain 
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level of COMSEC and COMPUSEC in the field? If an adversary intrudes upon the 
network via wireless means, can this intrusion be detected and its effects mitigated 
somehow? What are the effects of such an intrusion on the system, both tactically and 
operationally? The only way to develop appropriate contingencies to these and a myriad 
other situations is by thoroughly testing and experimenting with the technologies in a 
realistic setting. 
As a caveat, it is important to note that, because of its inherent complexity, 
red teaming and vulnerability assessments will not find every possible weakness in a 
typical information system. However, if even a small percentage of these vulnerabilities 
are discovered and mitigated, the system will be that much more reliable and effective on 
the battlefield. By developing contingencies for these vulnerabilities, many others that 
may arise during actual operations may be handled more effectively. Red teaming will 
be discussed further in Chapter VI. 
c. Parallel Growth 
Careful consideration must be given to balance the integration of new 
technology. When developing software, the "hack and patch" technique will never find 
all the vulnerabilities in a system. Many in the industry assert that you can't build 
security into a system after the fact; it must be part of the original design. This said, it is 
unlikely that organizations would be able to obtain COTS systems that meet their security 
needs out of the. box. It is even more improbable that these systems could later be 
modified to fully meet these requirements. 
While this gives a fairly grim outlook on the security of systems, it is 
nothing new: many experts assert that no system can be built that is completely secure. 
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However, if organizations keep this constraint in mind, they can mitigate the effects of 
their system's vulnerabilities through many other means. Back-ups, redundant systems, 
and contingency planning are but a few of these methods. 
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VI. SECURITY IS A JOURNEY, NOT A DESTINATION 
A. OVERVIEW 
A twist on the old adage of "education is a journey, not a destination" applies to 
system security: "security is a journey, not a destination." Most agencies have a small 
number of people managing computer security who have extremely limited authority, 
training, and virtually no budget. Yet, as part of the Internet, these organizations are 
being relied upon to provide a minimum level of security and defense against malicious 
users. Fortunately, recent accomplishments within industry and government research 
centers have focused on information assurance as the next step in the ''journey" towards a 
secure system of systems. 
The work done over the last decade primarily focused on providing a "stopgap" 
measure to "plug the holes" in the Internet while the GII was still in its formative stage. 
These stopgap measures historically focused on the "prevent" side (i.e., access control 
technologies), with an emphasis on authentication technologies, conventional security 
technology, and forensic technology. Unfortunately, the only way to make an 
information system completely secure is to unplug it, encase it in concrete, and bury it in 
the ground. While this may seem like an exaggeration, anything short of this introduces 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries. Obviously, taking such extreme 
measures makes the system completely unusable. So, how can systems be made usable 
to the general population, while providing a measure of security and assurance? 
Providing this defensive posture for the Internet - which was never meant to be 
used in a secure setting - has created an environment where technology is influencing the 
environment its used in. Burton and Obel provide a counterpoint to this, stating that "an 
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organization must influence and change the technology." [Ref. 52] In other words, the 
organization must choose its technology. If this argument is accepted, then information 
assurance must be chosen as the next step in the journey. From either perspective, the 
organizational structure and the technology must offer each other a good fit. 
There is a growing awareness of the increasing threat to the NII and the Gil, but 
what can be done about it? Securing and safeguarding this highly complex "system of 
systems" should be one of the Nation's highest priorities. The ability to counter these 
threats, however, will require a significant shift in how business is currently being done. 
Fortunately, this change is already underway, both in government and in the industrial 
complex. 
B. FROM VISION TO REALITY 
Technology begets doctrine, and doctrine begets organization; we need 
that sequence of events badly. We have the technology, and now we have 
a clear-cut strategic doctrine at the national level for information· 
operations. [Ref. 53] 
This strategic doctrine is focused on providing tools for intelligence agencies and 
military services to develop defensive, offensive, and exploitation information operations 
capabilities. However, this doctrine falls short of being truly strategic, since it does not 
provide the tools for vulnerability testing (i.e., red teaming), nor addresses the balancing 
act between cost, implementation, performance, and people. These issues are of 
paramount importance, and will be addressed later in this chapter. 
How can mission-critical information technology and the Nation's critical 
infrastructure be protected against electronic attack? First, an appropriate vision must be 
developed. The Information Technology Office (ITO) at DARPA, developed a vision 
statement that is supportive of the development of new technology: 
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Create technologies for use in building hardened information systems and 
networks that have strong barriers to attack, can detect malicious and 
suspicious activity, can isolate and repel such activity where possible, and 
can guarantee minimum essential continued operation of critical system 
functions in the face of concerted information attacks. These technologies 
will enable the construction of secure enclaves, and will allow distributed 
computing to span such enclaves, as is required in ISO's systems. These 
technologies will combine the strength needed for DoD, while retaining 
the cost savings resulting from use of COTS. [Ref. 54] 
The growth of the "global village" through the expansion of the Internet has 
prompted industry to begin stepping up to the challenge of developing strategies for 
survivability, assurance, and security research. The current strategy is to develop 
technologies that can be combined to form a layered defense for information systems. 
This layered defense is the enabler for providing information assurance to the decision-
maker. An overview of these technologies follows. 
1. Barriers to Penetration 
The term "layered defense" is frequently discussed as part of many of the 
"strategic visions" that the authors have reviewed. In keeping with the layered defense 
strategy, barriers to penetration have to be addressed at multiple system levels. This is 
the case not only in the traditional network and operating system layer, but also in the 
increasingly important middleware layers for the distributed system security and 
distributed computing systems. There is also a need to push security technology into the 
application level, allowing the integration of COTS and legacy systems into military 
systems. 
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2. Network Security 
At the network level, security for the Internet's domain name system has been 
developed, providing authenticated name address mapping between domain servers, 
security for routing tables, etc. 
3. Middleware 
Recently, middleware layers have benefited from the development of fine grained 
access control for Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA), an 
increasingly important technology for distributed computing. CORBA essentially 
provides the architecture for the plumbing of a distributed system. The CORBA Security 
Service (CORBAsec) includes facilities for authentication [Ref. 55]. The CORBA 
Immune System at Odyssey Research Associates [Ref. 56] is using CORBA interceptors 
(wrappers) to look for anomalous operation invocation sequences. This has created an 
opportunity to define true interoperability among systems by specifying how the Object 
Request Brokers (ORB's) from different vendors can interoperate. 
4. Operating Systems 
Security used to be a big part of operating systems (OS) research. The divergence 
of performance-oriented OS work and security-oriented OS work over the years needs to 
be recombined so that innovative security programs can be incorporated into research 
projects at the ground level. The result of this would be that when these programs are 
ready for implementation, security and performance would already be built in. This 
concept was developed as part of the Khazana project at the University of Utah [Ref. 57]. 
The OS allows secure encapsulation of services, so that conventional file and network 
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services can invoke separate encapsulated servers for authentication cryptography, and all 
of this can be controlled and managed by a separate policy server. 
5. Coordination 
Some significant work has been done in developing a coordinated intrusion 
detection effort within the information infrastructure. This work has led to the 
establishment of an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [Ref. 58] working group to 
create a common set of interfaces and protocols for exchanging information among 
detectors. A draft of this standard is expected by the end of 1999. 
What's the significance of this coordination? To assess this, one must consider a 
truly national - or global - scale system, where detection reports are propagated up 
through the hierarchy of the system, in order to identify when attacks that are coordinated 
across different systems and administrative domains might be taking place. 
Once this global detection is coordinated, the issue of false alarms must be 
addressed. A lot of events reported are either trivial, or are only of local interest. A 
method needs to be developed to allow only the important information to propagate up 
the chain. Similarly, once the assessments have been done at the higher level, a global 
context needs to be provided that can be used to drive the local intrusion detection 
mechanisms, and tell them what information is significant (i.e., what information needs to 
be collected that isn't being collected now). The follow-on step to this is inferring a 
model of what we think our adversaries are doing, and predicting what the next phase of 
the attack will be. This provides the opportunity to conduct some sort of pre-emptive 
action. 
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6. Intrusion Tolerance 
Intrusion tolerant networks are capable of maximizing the residual capacity of the 
network infrastructure following partial compromise. This can be done in three parts. 
a. Fault Tolerance 
In order to do this, the basic fault tolerance and robustness of the network 
infrastructure must first be improved. 
b. Countering Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks 
A second part of this revolves around denial of service attacks. Can 
resource consumption in the network be controlled, in order to prevent DoS attacks? An 
example of countering a DoS attack is constraining the attacker's resource consumption. 
One idea is to use advanced resource allocation methods, such as those based on market 
or economic schemes that will limit the resources available to the attacker. [Ref. 59] 
c. Exploiting Technology 
The third part is exploiting technologies that have been developed in other 
parts of the information technology world. An example of this technology includes 
inferring a model of what we think the adversaries are doing, and predicting what the 
next phase of the attack would be, and maybe taking some sort of pre-emptive action. 
7. Attack Forensics 
Attack forensics (or post-attack analysis) is the primary tool used for the 
development of attack profiles. By observing patterns of behavior - both normal and 
anomalous - these profiles can be established over a period of time. The problem with 
using attack forensics is that they produce too much information for security managers to 
effectively handle. [Ref. 60] 
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How can a method at looking at attack forensics be developed to determine what 
damage has occurred, and what needs to be done, in near real-time? DERBI, a program 
developed at the Software Research Institute (SRI), is being used to try to answer this 
question. It is touted as "a state of the art program in intrusion damage assessment and 
reconstitution." Human functions are automated in the assessment of damage and 
rebuilding of a system to a previously assured state. [Ref. 61] 
These seven strategies form the foundation for the next phase of technology to 
support information assurance goals. Yet, their implementation will fall short if not 
applied using a strategic approach. Vulnerability testing and the balancing of cost, 
implementation, performance, and personnel must be done in order to have a truly 
strategic and effective implementation of information assurance. 
C. BALANCING ACT 
The additional leverage gained by an increasing focus on information assurance 
may provide the impetus for the development of trustworthy systems from untrustworthy 
components. This change is necessary to balance technology with cost, implementation, 
performance, and personnel. 
1. Cost and Implementation 
The amount of money spent on the research and development of new information 
systems and the subsequent investment in security for these systems far outweighs the 
money spent on their implementation and integration. This condition needs to be brought 
into balance. For instance, training of our system administrators and operators, basic 
operator education, and incentives to maintain a "corporate memory" should receive an 
equitable investment. 
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The implementation of an information system must be completed in a timely 
fashion, in balance with the capabilities of the system its being introduced into, as well as 
its environment (i.e., personnel and equipment). When implementation is too drawn out, 
the rapid pace at which technology advances tends to cause serious problems: a system 
can become obsolete before it has even become operational. 
2. Performance 
Performance takes on a different connotation within the DoD than it does within a 
commercial organization. DoD personnel carry out their assigned missions with the 
understanding that they may be called upon to do so at risk of life or limb. In such 
instances, they must rely on their information infrastructure to perform with a minimum 
level of assurance. A similar situation exists in many critical civilian applications, such 
as law enforcement, medicine, emergency services, etc. If these minimum levels are not 
met, the results could be disastrous. 
Performance is closely tied to risk management: in order to gauge the assurance 
level of a particular system, it is necessary to conduct vulnerability testing. This testing 
must be continuous in order to keep pace with changes in the cyberterrorism threat. 
3. Personnel 
People are our weakest link and our strongest adversary. To our benefit, the 
essence of our competitive advantage lies in the fact that, regardless of the source of 
motivation to excel, the goal of DoD personnel is the same as that of private sector 
organizations: to do what they do, better than anyone else. Unfortunately, one size 
doesn't fit all when trying to identify the best set of policies and practices for all involved 
in information assurance. 
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D. DEVELOPMENT OF TRUSTWORTHY SYSTEMS 
Developing secure systems that provide an acceptable level of information 
assurance in a constantly changing environment requires a diversified, iterative approach, 
as shown in Figure 2. It is not enough to concentrate on any one particular area; each 
element of the model is crucial to success. In the past, the burden of security and 
assurance was typically placed on system designers and developers. Dr. David Fisher of 
CERT has highlighted the downfall of this approach: 
Anything that is "extremely unlikely" can be made into a vulnerability and 
be exploited by a malicious user. The statistical development of software 
and operating systems in a "clean room" does not resolve the associated 
security issues. You can't build secure systems through statistical 
methodologies. [Ref. 62] 
Recent accomplishments in information survivability programs over the last few years 
have emphasized a much more multi-dimensional approach. Security and assurance are 
being addressed at all levels and as an on-going process. 
Over the last two years, industry has renewed its focus on developing attack 
barriers, while looking at combining detection mechanisms into coordinated 
constellations of detectors that can detect large-scale attacks. In spite of the best efforts 
at preventing and detecting these attacks, there will still be successful attacks that at least 
partially compromise system assets. Once these large-scale constellations are 
operational, the next step to take is improvements in intrusion tolerance: developing 
methods where information survivability can be insured, even while the system is under 
attack. This natural progression begs the question: how can we rapidly assess damage, 
repair damage, keep the system functioning, keep critical operations running, and 
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mitigate the effects of the attack? The use of vulnerability testing and the implementation 
of system diversity play a major role in answering this question. 
1. Red teaming 
Why should a renewed emphasis be applied to the concept of vulnerability testing 
through red teaming? First and foremost, red teaming is the most important aspect of 
information assurance. The investment in information technology is significantly out of 
balance with the investment in providing assurance and security protection to the same 
system. Red teaming provides risk assessment for the evaluation of our information 
infrastructure. This impact is seen from the local level all the way to the Global 
Information Infrastructure. It identifies the possible and probable impacts of the 
introduction of new technology into these information infrastructures. The focus on the 
fortress mentality earlier in this decade only addressed known threats. 
Barrier defense mechanisms are designed to address external threats only. Insider 
threats are typically unaffected by these types of defensive measures. The increased 
interconnectivity of our information systems compounds this problem even further. As 
Dr. Fisher has stated, ''we live in a world where everyone is an insider; you literally don't 
know what machines are attached to your system if you are connected to the Internet." 
[Ref. 63] Thus, as Internet use continues to grow, both the "insider threat" and the 
external threat become increasingly prevalent. Red teaming provides a means of 
identifying security gaps and vulnerabilities from an insider's - as well as an outsider's -
perspective. 
Vulnerability assessment provides an important tool for risk management. In 
order to be manageable, risks must first be clearly identified. Once identified, these risks 
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can then be mitigated. Thus, red teaming is central to the concept of information 
assurance: if you can't identify a vulnerability or a weakness, you can't reduce the 
associated risks, and you can't provide assurance. 
So how is information assurance implemented? Figure 2 provides an example 
that combines enablers from industry and the Marine Corps Advanced Warfighting 
Experiment (A WE). A system model has been assessed as needing an enhancement 
through the implementation of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology. The 
Marine Corps W arfighting Lab (WFL) and industry representatives develop an 
operational model, implementing many of the emerging capabilities previously discussed 
in this chapter. This model is introduced into the system model where it is continually 
experimented with and analyzed by the A WE and WFL. Simultaneously, the system 
model is red teamed from an independent vulnerability assessment organization, with a 
"no holds barred" mentality. This continuous cycle provides the decision-maker with an 
intrusion tolerant network that maximizes the residual capacity of the network structure, 
even following a partial compromise. 
The methodology for developing trustworthy systems from untrustworthy 
components is depicted in Figure 2. The system model is consistently assessed against 
models of missions, adversaries, and vulnerability assessments. The adversarial models 
are particularly useful in creating a counterattack profile. The ability to develop various 
levels of response, including autonomous and "cyber command and control," is 





Figure 2. Information Assurance Model. 
Decisions 
AWE/WFL 
Vulnerability Testing conducted as a singular event, whose focus is on system and 
network administrators, provides an extremely limited vision that is anything but 
strategic. Red teaming should be continuous, unexpected, and have the ability to utilize 
any method available through open sources. 
2. Diversity 
Future defense systems are likely going to be composed largely of commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) and third party components, some of these such as popular 
commercial operating systems (OS's) introduce shared vulnerabilities into these, systems. 
A vulnerability in one part of the code is replicated hundreds of thousands of times across 
the system and can represent a serious vulnerability to the overall operation of the 
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system. How can controlled diversity be introduced into these COTS systems in order to 
mitigate some of these vulnerabilities? 
In a heterogeneous network, if an intruder only knows mandatory access control 
security (MACS), and breaks into the system, an adaptive system can re-route or isolate 
the attack. Then, if the rest of the system is composed of different architectures (i.e., is 
diverse), the intruder will have a hard time trying to break in. This is usually the case 
because most attackers are familiar (i.e., experts) with only one type of system. 
It becomes too expensive for attackers to have the technology and capability to 
break into multiple, heterogeneous systems. It is cheaper to be an expert in only one 
(unique) system than to be expert at many different systems. The key is to make 
breaking in to a system expensive relative to the value the attacker receives. 
Ultimately, we must get away from the fortress mentality and find another 
solution. The reason is that the fortress mentality is expensive, and based 
on unique systems that still have vulnerabilities. When attacked, they 
create a greater loss. Responding with any form of Incident Response 
Team is not very efficient, and has limited value. [Ref. 64] 
E. INFORMATION SURVIVABILITY 
If experience is the best teacher, as the saying goes, then we've been in school a 
long time and learned some valuable lessons. Information assurance is the next chapter 
in the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA). The history of the United States is rife with 
analogies supportive of this statement. An excellent example is the advent of air power, 
and the significance of its influence on warfare as we know it today. 
The significance of the cyberterrorist threat to the Nation's critical infrastructure 
is causing a similar revolution to occur. The infrastructure, with its inherent insecurities, 
61 
has had too much invested in it to discard. Therefore, the only alternative is to modify it, 
providing security and assurance to an entity that was never designed for those attributes. 
Within DoD, significant and lasting modifications to warfighting doctrine 
occurred· based on the requirements developed through the introduction of air power. The 
requirement for providing information survivability through information assurance 
necessitates similar action. 
This philosophy is supported by the notion that technology drives doctrine 
(through requirements), and doctrine drives organizational behavior. How can this be 
modified to support the RMA being experienced today? As depicted in Figure 6-2 
education is training, training identifies requirements for technology, which drives 
doctrine, which drives organizational behavior, which in tum drives education. 
Many of the information technologies developed in the last decade focused on 
providing a strictly defensive capability. How do we capitalize on this information and 
formulate a strategy that will provide a reaction that allows for mission accomplishment? 
There are two answers to this. First is the autonomous level, the automatic response - or 
quick reaction cycle - when an attack is detected. Second, we must have command and 
control functions that understand what the impact of that state (of attack) is and how to 
respond to it. 
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Organizational Behavior 
Figure 3. Organizational Behavior Loop. 
What are the rapid defense mechanisms that can be implemented to contain an 
attack ofthis type? Considering the nature of the attack in context of the mission requires 
some sort of human intervention (i.e., higher level brain function) to give the system a 
global understanding of the strategy that an adversary might be using, and formulate a 
measured response to it. The development of our defensive posture has resulted in a 
variety of sensors and exploitation mechanisms. The higher level functions that extract 
information state awarenes~ from these sensors are now sorely needed. All of this 
supports an overall defense strategy. 
F. THE NEXT STEP 
Serendipity; it means making fortunate and unexpected discoveries by accident. 
The idea of providing information assurance was discovered at the realization that a 
fortress mentality was not applicable to the Internet. Information assurance is a natural 
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progression in the war against nefarious intruders of the information infrastructure. The 
raising of consciousness due to the advent of these attacks on our information 
infrastructure has provided the catalyst for senior leadership in industry and government 
to focus on the issues of information assurance. 
Significant consideration has been given to the realm of prevention and detection 
of anomalous behavior. There has been a large amount of work done in terms of 
prevention, but it has lost the momentum it once held. The advances of information 
terrorism have mitigated the effectiveness of prevention. 
The recent accomplishments in industry discussed previously have been driven by 
the requirement to provide at least some level of autonomous response. The increasingly 
technical aspects of the Gii, combined with the disparate lack of security within it, have 
provided the basis for this requirement. No matter how good the system is, people are 
still the weak link. The inability to provide a proper balance of the implementation of 
information technology with trained personnel and system administrators actually 
detracts from information assurance. There are no silver bullets here. Providing 
information assurance necessitates a well rounded, in depth approach. Particular 
attention must be given to those areas previously neglected, such as the implementation 
of vulnerability testing of emerging and existing information technology. 
This will only be truly successful if an equitable balance in the investment 
associated with research and development and implementation is achieved. Then - and 
only then - will information assurance truly provide decision makers with confidence in 
their information systems, even when under attack or stress, through integrated 
information security in next-generation defense systems. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of 
war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur. 
[Ref. 65] 
What is the impact of cyberterrorism on DoD, and how must we manage the 
requirement to focus on this as a threat? The goal of this thesis was to provide some 
insight into this question through research of this new face of terrorism, and identify what 
can be done to provide assurance to the flow of digital information that is viewed as a 
target by cyberterrorists. A variety of views on cyberterrorism were researched, 
including the creation of a scenario-based cyberterrorist organization, Cyber Fi. Cyber Fi 
was created to facilitate research of current and future cyberterrorist threats and counter 
measures during one of the Marine Corps Advanced Warfighting Experiments, Urban 
Warrior. The result of these evaluations was a requirement for the development of a truly 
strategic policy for cyberterrorism. Our research also highlighted the criticality and 
difficulty of crafting a vision to direct and shape a change effort. 
The problem with establishing a set policy on cyberterrorism arises from the fact 
that the full extent of the threat spectrum is, as yet, unknown. The need for policy - and 
the lack of one within the federal government - is forcing agencies to go their own way 
and establish their own. Martin Libicki proposed: "If we are to have a cooperative 
international agreements and treaties, a declared policy is an essential starting point." 
[Ref. 66] He went on to say, "the policy should be coordinated with industry and public 
debate encouraged to secure support and resources required to protect our interests." 
[Ref. 67] 
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A. THE SIDFT TOWARDS INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
The continued migration of society's support functions into Cyberspace requires a 
trusted environment that allows critical operations, even when the system is partially 
compromised. This increasing dependence will lead to increasing vulnerabilities. There 
will be a parallel increase in the utility of cyberterrorism as well. These issues demand 
the foundation of a trusted environment that is necessary for information sharing between 
government (including DoD) and industry. This trusted environment paves the road 









enables the creation of a strategic cyber defense network, 
is part of an evolutionary change from a point security or barrier defense 
to the next (necessary) step of providing defense in depth to support the 
decision makers' needs, 
allowed for the development of trusted systems made up of untrustworthy 
components, 
provides capabilities for the protection, detection, reaction, and restoration 
of information systems, 
requires extensive and realistic red teaming, 
must provide a quantifiable level of security and assurance, and 
is sensitive to system design, thereby highlighting differences m 
competing concepts. 
Critical to the implementation of information assurance is the positive momentum 
in the convergence of government and the commercial sector in the area of Information 
Operations (IO), Information Warfare (IW), and cyberterrorism. A proposal for 
enhanced red teaming was presented in Chapters V and VI. Red teaming allows 
evaluators to identify performance measures that ultimately provide a system 
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effectiveness value. This value can be used to compare the relative capabilities of 
emerging technologies that are integrated into a risk management approach. This risk 
management approach is then applied to an evaluation of the overall information 
infrastructure to satisfy the decision-makers needs. Ideally, this proposed evaluation will 
be used by information infrastructure architects to evaluate competing information 
systems intended for DoD, National, and Global use. 
B. PERSONNEL ISSUES 
The human resources frame is built on core assumptions that highlight the linkage 
between people and organizations. Increased competition for human capital provides the 
catalyst for a proactive (vice reactive) approach to personnel issues. Human resources 
must be managed by leaders in order "to obtain organizational performance by 
channeling individual potential into organizational achievement." [Ref. 68] The authors 





The training of our system administrators and operators, basic operator 
education, and incentives to maintain a "knowledge base" should receive 
an equitable investment when compared to the cost of information 
technology . 
The level of training and education of information technology personnel 
must be significantly improved . 
The commitment incurred to acquire this level of training should also be 
increased . 
The implementation of information systems must be completed in a timely 
fashion, in balance with the capabilities of the system it's being introduced 
into, as well as the environment (i.e., personnel and equipment). 
C. STRATEGIC POLICY 
Cyberterrorism is likely to mature rapidly; therefore, we must minimize the threat 
through strategic policy. This policy must incorporate the use of red teaming, and 
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address the increasingly convoluted personnel issues associated with the rapid advance of 
information technology. If we fail to address these issues, we may find ourselves 
enveloped in the fog of cyberwar. Incorporation of these ideas into national policy will 
provide precedence for dealing with future cyberterrorist threats against the United States 
critical infrastructure. 







Develop a cost-benefit analysis model for implementing vulnerability 
testing (red teaming) . 
Develop a training and retention model for people with the skill sets and 
core competencies required to do the job . 
Conduct a study of different methods (e.g., bonuses/longer term 
commitments) to aid in the retention of information technology personnel. 
Develop measures of effectiveness/metrics to quantify a system's level of 
assurance . 
Identify an acceptable (baseline) level of information assurance . 
Develop models for the associated response to different levels of 
cyberterrorist attacks. 
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